Israel’s Future and Iran’s Nuclear Program – 2

Israel’s Reactions Are Counterproductive

None of the counterindications to a nuclear attack by Iran suggest that Iran’s attitude toward the Jewish state is destined to be friendly. Pragmatism, however, may return, as was the case during the Iran-Iraq War, when Israel sold weapons to Iran. (23) Iran remains the chief supporter of Hamas and Hezbollah, and the desire to see an end to the Jewish state, articulated originally by Ayatollah Khomeini and reiterated by Iran’s current president, is clear. (24)

But rather than the use of weapons of mass destruction, Iranian leaders are more likely to see patience and the continuance of current trends as the best route to their desired goal for Israel. Indeed, Israeli policies have played into the hands of the Iranian leaders. The West Bank occupation, counterproductive military operations in response to continual harassment, and intransigence on the freezing and removal of settlements have drained much of the reservoir of sympathy and support for Israel that existed at the time of the Six-Day War.

In addition, just the thought of Iran’s having nuclear weapons works to further the goals of the Iranian leaders toward Israel. As indicated earlier, by raising the specter of a first-strike nuclear attack by Iran, the Israelis have generated a public debate that obscures and exacerbates the demographic threat facing Israel as a democratic Jewish state. That threat to the Zionist project has no effective military countermeasure. Arguments in favor of an Israeli attack on Iran based on realpolitik considerations (25) also do not take this into account.

The Psychological Burden on Israelis

Consider the events of the past three years. In response to the kidnapping of two soldiers, Israel invaded Lebanon in 2006 for the second time in the past quarter century and engaged in a war with Hezbollah. The war did not weaken Hezbollah’s political position in Lebanon, nor did it prevent the launch of thousands of rockets into Northern Israel. Hezbollah’s ability to launch such rockets was degraded but not destroyed, and has apparently been rebuilt. A recent report in the Times of London claims that Hezbollah has stockpiled up to 40,000 rockets and is training its forces to use rockets capable of hitting Tel Aviv. (26) More recently, in response to rockets launched by Hamas into Southern Israel, particularly on the town of Sderot, Israel invaded Gaza. The intent was not only to shut down these launches, but also to cut off the smuggling into Gaza of contraband used for rocket construction and explosives. Like the war with Hezbollah, the war with Hamas has resulted in a public-relations disaster for Israel. Exploiting that public-relations advantage may be the reason for Hamas’s recent decision to suspend rocket firing, (27) which had continued at low levels along with Israeli air raids, in spite of the separately declared cease-fire agreements. (28) There is no indication that the suspension will be permanent, and a senior Hamas police commander has been quoted as saying Hamas is working on extending the range of its rockets. (29)

Both wars have been, arguably, a political necessity for Israel. No sovereign state could tolerate its neighbors continually firing rockets into its territory, regardless of the military ineffectiveness of those attacks. The failure to permanently stop the attacks, however, cannot help but raise further the psychological burden on Israelis who live within range of the current generation of rockets, as well as those who will inevitably be within range of the more advanced rockets being developed. The rockets’ randomness, along with the uncertainty as to their targets, is unnerving, as British citizens who were alive at the time of the German V-1 and V-2 attacks during the waning days of World War II can testify.

The burden on Israelis of the Iranian nuclear program should be seen through this same lens. Even if Iran does nothing more for the next few years than continue its development of advanced nuclear technology under international safeguards, its nuclear-weapons latency will advance concomitantly. This will lead to the inevitable conclusion that Iran will be able to quickly break out and construct a nuclear arsenal whenever it decides to do so. Despite the arguments advanced earlier as to why Iran is unlikely to make that decision soon-and, having made it, would be unlikely to wage nuclear war-the Israelis’ discomfort over the Iran program has risen significantly. It includes the fear of an Iranian nuclear “umbrella” over Hezbollah and Hamas, ostensibly protecting them from Israeli retaliation for rocket attacks. (30) But such an umbrella would not work, for the same reasons given earlier as to why Iran would not launch a nuclear attack against Israel. The fear, however, adds greatly to the already heavy burden produced by the prospect of further rocket harassment in the future.

The Real Threat Is to Zionism

Under these conditions, the Zionist project could stall and even reverse. If Israelis begin to believe that their government cannot protect them from nuclear attack or random rocket attacks, some percentage of those who can do so will leave for safer countries, and some Diaspora Jews considering immigration to Israel may rethink their plans. Perhaps more important, those who leave are more likely to be secular Jews, not committed by religious or messianic fervor to remain, while the opposite would be true of most of those who immigrate. This would move the country further away from the secular ideals of its founders and give its religious zealots more power over policy. Recent data show that more people are leaving Israel than are immigrating to it. (31) This trend could be exacerbated by a possible economic decline if foreign investment and tourism decrease as a result of the fear of nuclear war.

The Israeli political establishment is adding to these concerns by fanning hysteria over the Iranian nuclear program. If they convince Israelis that the Iranian leaders are insane enough to start a nuclear war and produce another holocaust, then it would be equally insane for Jews to immigrate to Israel or to remain there in the face of such a threat. This logic makes it easy for Zionists to join forces with American hardliners on Iran and advocate military action. The latter may not care about Zionism but desire to maintain and extend U.S. geopolitical influence in the region, which they fear would be threatened by Iran’s emergence as a nuclear-weapons state.

Whether such a preventive war with Iran would result in enhanced U.S. influence in the region is unclear, considering the degree of outrage it would likely engender in every country in the region, including those whose leaders might secretly welcome it. But the war’s power to stanch the current population drain from Israel would be doubtful. War would certainly result in a worldwide hardening of Muslim attitudes toward Israel, organized boycotts of Israeli goods, divestment and sanctions directed against some Israeli institutions if not the government itself. There would likely be an increase in terrorist attacks against Jews, possibly making it difficult for Israelis to travel abroad in safety. This puts Israel and the Zionist project between a rock and a hard place. Attacking Iran is unlikely to make Israel’s Jewish population feel safer in the long term and might even accelerate emigration in the short term. But the fear of war, nuclear or otherwise, is not the only thing disturbing the psychological comfort of Israelis.

Even without a nuclear threat or rocket attacks, if a “two state solution” with the Palestinians continues to be elusive, and the birthrate of Palestinians both within and outside Israel remains at or near current levels, the fear of Israel becoming a binational state in the future will add to the current concerns of the Jewish majority, especially if emigration and immigration levels continue on their current path. The combination of a perceived future threat to Israel’s Jewish character plus the increasing political power of the extremist religious Jews who view the settlements in the West Bank as God’s plan, sets up a dangerous internecine political fight with unpredictable consequences. Israelis, usually on the left, who have supported some kind of peace process in the past are increasingly pessimistic about reaching an accommodation with the Palestinians. Nothing shows this better than the wide support in Israel for the recent war in Gaza, a war that has resulted in virtually worldwide condemnation of Israel’s tactics. The election of a new government, whose minister of foreign affairs, Avigdor Lieberman, is viewed by many as a racist demagogue, is another indicator that the ranks of the accommodationists within Israel are shrinking.

It is astonishing in retrospect that events and the passage of time since the Six-Day War and the Iranian revolution have resulted in young Iranians becoming more demanding of relief from the strictures of Sharia law and the mullahs, while young people in Israel, based on straw polls taken in high schools during the recent Israel election, are moving toward embracing the radical, racist politics of Avigdor Lieberman. (32) Lieberman’s once-expressed support for the expulsion of Israeli Arabs might, if carried out, provide some temporary relief from the fear of losing the Jewish majority in Israel, but it could be done only at the expense of virtually universal condemnation of Israel and significant erosion of support from the secular Jewish Diaspora. It would likely give Iran a get-out-of-jail-free card regarding its past and present nuclear activities and tamp down outside criticism of Hamas and Hezbollah.

To add to the political difficulties faced by Israel, an accommodation with the Palestinians cannot be done without substantive engagement with (Iran-supported) Hamas and the dismantling of most settlements in the West Bank. Having had a settlement program in place for decades that now includes over 250,000 settlers with growing political power and support from some elements in the army, it is hard to see how Israel can dismantle major settlements and return to its pre-1967 borders or something close to them, without risking civil war. But, unless it dismantles the settlements and agrees to a real two-state solution with a viable and sovereign Palestinian state, there will be no peace for Israel. Without peace, Iran’s nuclear program, along with the threat of a resumption of rocket fire, will continue to plague the collective psyche of Israelis.

Zionism’s original goal was to bring all Jews in the Diaspora to a Jewish homeland in the Holy Land. It had its best opportunity when Israel was created as a result of the collective world guilt generated by the Holocaust, and by the enthusiasm of a generation of committed, idealistic, optimistic young Jews in league with cold-eyed political architects and operatives. But, as the original promise of a democratic, Jewish “land of milk and honey” has given way to never-ending conflict that could turn nuclear, the growth of religious extremism, the rise of a political class rife with corruption, and a recognition of unfavorable population demographics have combined to replace optimism by a sense of despair among many Israelis. This contributes to the threat of failure for the Zionist project.

U.S. and Israeli Policy Choices

While the success of the project is important to Jewish nationalists, it should not be considered a vital national-security interest of the United States. Thus, characterizing Iran’s nuclear program as an “existential threat” to Israel is an attempt to obtain support for sanctions and/or military action against Iran by conflating the physical destruction of Israel by a surprise nuclear attack, which Washington should actively work to prevent, with the demographic threats to the Zionist project, which the United States is under no obligation to alleviate. It is one thing to ask Americans to support Israeli military actions that would put them at risk from retaliation if Israel, an ally, is threatened with imminent nuclear attack; it is quite another to ask them to assume such risk simply on behalf of shoring up Zionism. Thus, President Obama’s warning to Prime Minister Netanyahu not to launch a surprise attack on Iran, which he delivered during the Israeli leader’s recent visit to Washington, is appropriate and implies that there will be no American support for such a venture. (33)

It is only by negotiated compromise and peace with the Palestinians, Iran and the Arab states that Israel can solidify its desired status as a prosperous, democratic Jewish state. The difficulties of reaching that goal are well recognized and daunting, but there is no realistic alternative. Among other things, it is the only sure path toward ultimately converting the Middle East into a nuclear-weapons-free zone in which no country feels the need to produce such weapons to protect its security or enlarge its international influence.

Notes:

(23) See T. Parsi, Treacherous Alliance-The Secret Dealings of Iran, Israel and the United States (Yale University Press, 2007), pp. 107-108.

(24) In a speech given at an anti-Zionist meeting in Asia, Iran’s president, Mahmoud Ahmedinejad, was quoted in an official translation as having said, “(Israel) should be wiped off the map,” The original phrase in Farsi had been uttered by the Ayatollah Khomeini years before. Some have translated the phrase as “… eliminated from the pages of history.” In a subsequent interview, Ahmedinejad denied that he was making a military threat, using as an analogy the nonviolent collapse of the Soviet Union resulting in its being “wiped off the map,” His intent is still a matter of debate, but in any case, it is the ruling council headed by the Ayatollah Khamenei, rather than the Iranian president, that has the power to engage in war.

(25) See D. Samuels, “Why Israel Will Bomb Iran,” Slate Magazine, April 9, 2009. http://www.slate.com/id/2215820/

(26) See R. Beeston and N. Blanford, “Hezbollah stockpiles 40,000 rockets near Israel’s border,” TimesOnline, August 5, 2009. http://www-timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/ middle_east/article6739175.ece

(27) See E. Bronner, “Hamas Shifts From Rockets to Culture War,” The New York Times, July 23, 2009. http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/24/world/middleeast/24gaza.html?

(28) See “Hamas Criticizes Gaza Rocket Fire,” Al Jazeera News, March 13, 2009, http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2009/03/ 20093130140335534.html.

(29) See E. Bronner, op. tit.

(30) See C. Freilich, op. cit.

(31) See Deutsche-Presse Agentur, “Emigration from Israel Exceeds Immigration, Report,” April 20, 2007, http://stlouis.ujcfedweb.org/page.aspx?id=144274.

(32) See M.J. Rosenberg, “The Rise of Avigdor Lieberman,” Los Angeles Times, Feb. 11, 2009, http://www.latimes.com/news/printedition/opinion/ la-oe-rosenberg 11-2009feb11,0,5037251.story.

(33) A. Benn and H. Mozgovaya, “Obama Warns Netanyahu: Don’t Surprise Me with Iran Strike,” Ha’aretz, May 14, 2009, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/ spages/1085466.html.

Find similar articles about Iran with Google: Iran, Iran News, Iran Nuclear, Iran Times, Iran War

Republished by Iran Times

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